



National Library
of Canada

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services Branch

Direction des acquisitions et
des services bibliographiques

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0N4

395 rue Wellington
Ottawa (Ontario)
K1A 0N4

Publications des bibliothèques

Publications des bibliothèques

NOTICE

AVIS

The quality of this microform is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

La qualité de cette microforme dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise au microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

S'il manque des pages, veuillez communiquer avec l'université qui a conféré le grade.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us an inferior photocopy.

La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer, surtout si les pages originales ont été dactylographiées à l'aide d'un ruban usé ou si l'université nous a fait parvenir une photocopie de qualité inférieure.

Reproduction in full or in part of this microform is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30, and subsequent amendments.

La reproduction, même partielle, de cette microforme est soumise à la Loi canadienne sur le droit d'auteur, SRC 1970, c. C-30, et ses amendements subséquents.

Canada

STABILITY AND CHANGE OF THE SELF-CONCEPT IN SELF-DISCREPANCY
THEORY

by

Inna Vlassev
B.A., Sofia University *Kliment Ohridski*, Bulgaria, 1989

THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL PULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

in the Department
of
Psychology

(c) Inna Vlassev, 1994
SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY
December, 1994

All rights reserved. This work may not be reproduced in whole or
in part, by photocopy or other means, without permission of the
author.



National Library
of Canada

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services Branch

Direction des acquisitions et
des services bibliographiques

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0N4

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa (Ontario)
K1A 0N4

Author file - Notice bibliographique

©L.N.B. - Notice bibliographique

**THE AUTHOR HAS GRANTED AN
IRREVOCABLE NON-EXCLUSIVE
LICENCE ALLOWING THE NATIONAL
LIBRARY OF CANADA TO
REPRODUCE, LOAN, DISTRIBUTE OR
SELL COPIES OF HIS/HER THESIS BY
ANY MEANS AND IN ANY FORM OR
FORMAT, MAKING THIS THESIS
AVAILABLE TO INTERESTED
PERSONS.**

**L'AUTEUR A ACCORDE UNE LICENCE
IRREVOCABLE ET NON EXCLUSIVE
PERMETTANT A LA BIBLIOTHEQUE
NATIONALE DU CANADA DE
REPRODUIRE, PRETER, DISTRIBUER
OU VENDRE DES COPIES DE SA
THESE DE QUELQUE MANIERE ET
SOUS QUELQUE FORME QUE CE SOIT
POUR METTRE DES EXEMPLAIRES DE
CETTE THESE A LA DISPOSITION DES
PERSONNE INTERESSEES**

**THE AUTHOR RETAINS OWNERSHIP
OF THE COPYRIGHT IN HIS/HER
THESIS. NEITHER THE THESIS NOR
SUBSTANTIAL EXTRACTS FROM IT
MAY BE PRINTED OR OTHERWISE
REPRODUCED WITHOUT HIS/HER
PERMISSION.**

**L'AUTEUR CONSERVE LA PROPRIETE
DU DROIT D'AUTEUR QUI PROTEGE
SA THESE. NI LA THESE NI DES
EXTRAITS SUBSTANTIELS DE CELLE-
CI NE DOIVENT ETRE IMPRIMES OU
AUTREMENT REPRODUITS SANS SON
AUTORISATION.**

ISBN 0-612-06845-5

Canada

APPROVAL

Name: Inna Vlashev

Degree: Master of Arts

Title of Thesis: Stability and Change of the Self-
Concept in Self-Discrepancy Theory

Examining Committee:

Chairman: Dr. Christopher D. Webster

Marlene M. Moretti, Ph.D.
Senior Supervisor

Roger Buehler, Ph.D.

Lucy LeMare, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor
Department of Education
Simon Fraser University
External Examiner

Date Approved: 16 Dec 74

PARTIAL COPYRIGHT LICENSE

I hereby grant to Simon Fraser University the right to lend my thesis, project or extended essay (the title of which is shown below) to users of the Simon Fraser University Library, and to make partial or single copies only for such users or in response to a request from the library of any other university, or other educational institution, on its own behalf or for one of its users. I further agree that permission for multiple copying of this work for scholarly purposes may be granted by me or the Dean of Graduate Studies. It is understood that copying or publication of this work for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

Title of Thesis/Project/Extended Essay

Stability and Change of the Self-Concept in Self-discrepancy Theory

Author:

(signature)

Inna Vlassev

(name)

(date)

ABSTRACT

This study investigated the issue of changes in the construction of the actual-self as a result of the accessibility of own versus other guides. The moderating effect of self-consciousness in the construction of the actual-self was evaluated. Participants were 44 female and 41 male psychology undergraduates. In phase one of the study participants filled out the Self-Consciousness scale and the Selves Questionnaire. Four weeks later subjects were randomly assigned to a condition of Own-guides Prime, or Other-guides Prime. Following priming, subjects filled out the actual-self section and the self-guides section of the Selves Questionnaire. Results confirmed the prediction that actual-self is anchored in own standards if no particular self-guide is accessible. The relatedness between actual-self and own guides remained stable over time, regardless of whether we primed own, or other self-guides, and was not affected by individual differences in private and public self-consciousness. Priming other guides led to an increased degree of relatedness between actual-self and other guides. Contrary to our expectation, priming of own self-guides also resulted in an increased relatedness between actual-self and other guides. Exploratory analyses indicated that women are sensitive to activation of other self-guides. For men the salience of own guides accentuated the degree of congruency between the actual-self and own standards.

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the members of my committee for their support and guidance throughout this research. I am particularly thankful to Dr. Marlene Moretti for her intellectual acumen, commitment, and patience in helping me carry out this study. Special thanks to Dr. Roger Buehler for his insightful comments and enthusiastic interest in the study.

I would also like to thank Dr. Chris Roney and Dr. Bruce Alexander for their invaluable feedback on an early version of this paper.

Appreciation is extended to Dr. Lucy LeMare, who took the time to act as my external examiner.

A note of thankfulness goes to Elizabeth Michno and Joan Foster who never seemed tired of my numerous statistical inquiries.

Lastly, affectionate thanks to my parents and all who are close to me for your love and confidence in me.

"...not a structure built out of independently
existing unanalyzable entities,
but rather a web of relationships
between elements whose meaning arise
wholly from their relationships to the whole."

The dancing Wu Li Masters, Gary Zukav

Table of Contents

Introduction

The Stable Self.....	1
The Interpersonally Dynamic Self.....	2
The Self as a Cognitive Structure.....	3

Self-Discrepancy Theory.....5

Self-discrepancy research on emotional vulnerabilities and self-esteem.....	6
Availability and Accessibility of Self-discrepancies..	8
Priming Studies that manipulate accessibility of self-guides.....	9
Is the Actual-self autonomous from the self-guides..	11

Private and Public Self-Consciousness.....12

The Study.....14

Main Hypotheses.....14

Additional Exploratory Hypotheses.....16

Method

Participants.....17

Materials

Selves Questionnaire.....17

Scoring.....18

Public and Private

Self-Consciousness Scale.....19

Procedure.....20

Results.....22

Attrition Analyses.....22

Primacy of *own* self-guides.....23

Self-Consciousness as a moderator variable
in the relation between actual-self and self-
guides.....24

Changes in the actual-self after priming of
self-guides.....25

Priming *other* self-guides.....26

Priming *own* self-guides.....27

Self-Consciousness as a moderator in changes in
the self-system28

Exploratory analyses.....29

Discussion.....31

Own standards: the primary anchor of actual-self.....32

Stability of the self-system.....32

Fluidity of the self-system.....33

Gender differences in the construction of the
actual-self.....34

Contributions of current research.....34

Limitations and suggestions for future research.....36

Summary.....	38
References.....	40
Footnotes.....	47
Tables.....	48
Figures.....	56
Appendices.....	59

List of Tables

Table 1. Mean proportions of related attributes between the actual-self and own self-guides and the actual-self and other self-guides in Time1.....	48
Table 2. Means, standard deviations and medians for public and private self-consciousness.....	49
Table 3. Self-Consciousness Groups.....	50
Table 4. Mean proportion of related attributes between the actual-self and own and other self-guides for self-consciousness groups.....	51
Table 5. Mean proportion of related attributes between actual-self and other-guides and actual-self and own-guides at time 1 and time 2 for other-prime condition.....	52
Table 6. Mean proportions of related attributes between the actual-self and other-guides and the actual-self and own-guides at time 1 and time 2 for own-prime condition...	53
Table 7A. Means for own-related matches and own-related mismatches for males in own-prime and other-prime condition.....	54
Table 7B. Means for own-related matches and own-related mismatches for females in own-prime and other-prime condition.....	54
Table 8A. Means for other-related matches and other-related mismatches for males in own-prime and other-prime condition.....	55
Table 8B. Means for other-related matches and other-related mismatches for females in own-preime and other-prime condition.....	55

List of Figures

Figure 1. Self-discrepancy model.....	56
Figure 2. Mean difference scores of own-related matches for males and females.....	57
Figure 3. Mean difference scores of other-related matches for males and females.....	58

**STABILITY AND CHANGE OF THE SELF-CONCEPT IN SELF-DISCREPANCY
THEORY**

The concept of the self has long fascinated theorists and researchers. One particular dimension seems to have attracted the attention of philosophers, psychologists and sociologists in their attempt to explain and describe the qualities of the self - the self as an enduring structure versus the self as a changing process.

The stable self

Some theorists view the self as a relatively stable psychic structure. For example, Sullivan (1953) and Horney (1937) argued that, on the basis of early childhood experiences of socializing, individuals form a style of interacting that becomes typical of them. The self is perceived as a developmental achievement, and by the end of adolescence, it becomes a unit of relatively stable dispositions. The self is not viewed as being malleable to interpersonal experiences of the present. Kohut's self psychology (1971) discussed the self as evolved from relations with "self-objects" that the child gradually internalizes. This process brings about the development of the self. As with Horney and Sullivan, the notion of a relatively permanent psychic structure, based on early experiences is still present. More recently Wylie (1974) presented the idea of the generic self as an average view of the actual-self, ideal-self (own and other), social-self,

and own private-self. The generic self provides a sense of stability and continuity over time.

The interpersonally dynamic self

Yet, other early theories seem to have taken a somewhat different position. For example, William James (1890) proposed that individuals possess many different social selves represented in the images they believed significant others carry of them. This idea implies a self that changes its structure in reference to the social context. It stands in contrast with the notion of a consistent self that tends to be stable across various circumstances. Similarly, Cooley (1902) and Mead (1934) proposed that the self could not be viewed as fixed and general across all social conditions and contexts, although both theorists ascribed a somewhat stable collective property to the self.

Humanistic psychologists understand the self as an organized gestalt composed of perceptions of the "I", or "me" and perceptions of the relationship of the "I" to others and various aspects of life (Rogers, 1956). Unconditional positive regard from significant others is a warrant for self-congruency. Rogers' belief in the therapeutic effect of unconditional positive regard of a therapist toward a client, implies the idea of a self that is malleable to input coming from the present, rather than determined predominantly from past experiences.

The self as a cognitive structure

Modern ideas on the self in the last two decades have been dominated by the profusion of research on cognitive processes. The debate of a dynamic versus a static self receded to the background with theorists' efforts primarily devoted to operationalizing the self as a set of cognitive structures.

For example, information processing models have focused on demonstrating that the self is a knowledge structure stored in the memory like other knowledge structures. Anderson (1982) conceptualized the self simply as a node in a memory network. Markus (1977) described the self as a schema that has evolved from past social experiences and that guides the processing of self-relevant information. Rogers (1981) proposed that the self is a hierarchical structure whose elements are traits, values and memories of specific behaviours. As Gergen (1984) points out, although these models describe the self as an active entity that mediates and regulates behaviour, they do not address the issue of changes in the structure of the self concept that may occur as a result of this activity.

More recently the polemic of a stable versus dynamic self has resurged in the writings of social-cognitive psychologists. Kihlstrom and Cantor (1984) address explicitly the issue of stability of the self. They describe the self as one or more prototypes of specific exemplars. These prototypes consist of central and peripheral features,

organized in a loose hierarchy at varying levels of abstraction. However, the separate contextual prototypes are subordinate categories united by a superordinate prototype. The authors state that "the individual's self-concept provides for continuity amidst change, through the record of autobiographical memory; and change may be limited to those directions that are congruent with the individual's overall self-concept" (pp. 29).

Gergen (1982) presents an opposing view of the self based on the premises of social constructivism. He defines the self-concept as a moment-to-moment improvisation. Other theorists try to accommodate both perspectives (Markus & Kunda, 1986; Markus and Wurf, 1987). The idea of the *working self-concept* probably captures best this approach. The working self-concept is defined as that part of the complete self-concept which is most accessible at a given time. Core aspects of the self are relatively unresponsive to changes in one's circumstances, while other aspects vary. The working self-concept is thus described as the "core self-conceptions embedded in a context of more tentative self-conceptions that are tied to the prevailing circumstances" (Markus & Wurf 1987, pp.306).

From this brief review of the current social-cognitive self theories, it is evident that the dilemma of stability and change of the self remains a challenge.

In the present study we investigate the stability and change of the actual-self within the context of Self

Discrepancy theory. A more detailed discussion of the fundamental assumptions and research findings in self-discrepancy theory is presented below.

Self-Discrepancy Theory

Self-discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987) defines three basic domains of the self: (a) the *actual self*, representing the attributes that people believe they actually possess; (b) the *ideal self*, representing the traits and characteristics people wish or hope to possess; (c) the *ought self*, representing the traits and characteristics people believe they have an obligation or duty to possess (Higgins, 1987).

The self-discrepancy model includes the role of the individual's *own* standpoint, as well as the standpoint of significant *others*. Combining the domains of the self with each of the standpoints on the self, results in six basic types of self-state representations: actual/*own*, actual/*other*, ideal/*own*, ideal/*other*, ought/*own*, ought/*other*. Higgins conceptualizes the first representation of the actual-self, as the person's *self-concept*. The remaining self-state representations are *self-guides* providing standards for self evaluation and self regulation.

Self-discrepancy theory views the self as the relations between different constructs, or self aspects that are interconnected in ~~memory~~ memory. These cognitive constructs guide information processing and facilitate processing of self-relevant information (Higgins, 1989a; Higgins & Moretti,

1988; Higgins, Strauman, & Klein, 1986). More specifically, self-discrepancy theory focuses on incompatibilities of different self-state representations and their consequences for psychological functioning.

Self-discrepancy research on emotional vulnerabilities and self-esteem

Discrepancies between the actual-self and the self-guides are hypothesized to result in psychological distress. Self-discrepancy theory makes predictions about the specific types of negative psychological situations that will result from different self-discrepancies. When the actual-self is perceived as discrepant from the ideal/own or ideal/other guides, the person is vulnerable to dejection-related emotions. When the actual-self is perceived as discrepant from the ought/own or ought/other guides, people are likely to experience agitation-related emotions (Higgins, Bond, Starauman & Klein, 1986; Higgins, Klein & Strauman, 1985; Strauman, 1989). Discrepancies between the different self-guides lead to feelings of confusion, indecision, and rebelliousness independent of their relation to the actual-self (Van Hook & Higgins, 1988).

Research has also demonstrated the predictive validity of the self-discrepancy model for chronic emotional syndromes. More specifically, disappointment and dissatisfaction were found to be uniquely associated with actual/ideal-own discrepancies measured after a period of two months. Fear and restlessness were associated uniquely

with actual/ought-other discrepancies measured after a two month period. Furthermore, actual/ideal-own discrepancy was related to anger at self measured two months later, and actual/ought-other discrepancy was related to anger at others. Actual/ideal-own and actual/ought-other discrepancies have been associated with social anxiety and depression respectively measured weeks later (Strauman & Higgins, 1988).

Strauman (1989) compared clinically depressed and socially phobic individuals and found that depressives possessed the greatest discrepancy between their actual-self and ideal-own self-guides, while social phobics possessed the greatest discrepancy between their actual and ought-other self-states.

Moretti & Higgins (1990) found that the relation between actual-self attributes and ideal-self guides predicts self-esteem, independent of actual-self ratings. Specifically, only positive actual-self attributes that matched the ideal-self attributes correlated with high self-esteem, and only negative actual-self attributes that did not match the ideal-self attributes predicted low self-esteem.

Self-discrepancy theory also provides a model for developmental vulnerabilities. It is hypothesized that actual/ideal discrepancies emerge when parents focus on discrepancies between their children's behaviour and the hopes and wishes they hold for them. This parenting style

creates in the child the feeling of absence of positive outcomes. Second, it is hypothesized that when parents focus on aspects of their children's behaviour that are discrepant from the duties and obligation they prescribe for them, they are likely to punish and criticize their children. This parenting style is characterized by the presence of negative outcomes for the child, and is hypothesized to result in actual/ought discrepancies.

Availability and accessibility of self-discrepancies

Self-discrepancy theory discusses the notions of availability and accessibility of self-discrepancies. Availability refers to the kinds of constructs that exist in memory, while accessibility refers to the ease with which these constructs are used in information-processing (Higgins, 1987). The accessibility of discrepancies depends on how recently and how frequently they have been activated, and how relevant they are to a stimulus event (Higgins, 1987). The greater the number of discrepancies individuals possess, the more often they are likely to be activated and thus made accessible.

However, the issue of measuring and testing of hypothetical mental representations such as self-discrepancies has been a challenge for researchers (Higgins & Bargh, 1987). Priming methodologies have proven to be beneficial when assessing the effects of accessibility of discrepancies. In view of the fact that the current study

also employs a priming methodology, we review some of the pertinent self-discrepancy research.

Priming studies that manipulate the accessibility of self-guides

Higgins, Van Hook, and Dorfman (1988) used a modified Stroop color-word test to assess whether self-attributes form a structure similar to that of semantic memory. Subjects were shown slides of target words printed in different-coloured inks and were asked to name each word colour. Prior to each slide, subjects were given a memory load word, which they had to repeat after naming the colour of the target word. The memory load word functioned as a prime of either self-related or self-unrelated traits. It was found that self-related problematic, or mismatching attributes produced slower reaction times suggesting the interference from an interconnected structure. This finding is interpreted as validating the hypothesis that self-discrepancies are cognitive structures interconnected in memory.

In another study, while completing phrases about others, subjects were primed with an audiotape containing self-related mismatches, self-related nonmatches, or self-unrelated attributes (Strauman & Higgins, 1987). Only for mismatches the priming manipulation had an effect of automatic activation of self-discrepant attributes. It was concluded that mismatches constitute cognitive structures.

Furthermore, the activation of mismatches induced different types of emotional distress. Specifically, actual-ideal mismatches resulted in depressed affect, while actual-ought mismatches resulted in agitation.

In another experiment investigating the relation between self-regulatory approaches and self-discrepancies ideal/own and ought/other guides were primed (Roney & Sorrentino, 1992). The ideal/own prime asked subjects to think and write about their ideal self and ideal achievement standards, and to discuss if there had been any changes in their ideals since they were young. Similarly, the ought/other prime asked participants to think and write about the sense of duty they felt a significant other had for them for career, or general competence. Certainty-oriented people were found to perform better on an arithmetic test, after ideal standards were primed associated with no discrepancy. Uncertainty-oriented people performed better on the arithmetic test in the ideal prime condition than in the ought condition when the standards were associated with a discrepancy.

Therefore, the bulk of research today on self-discrepancy theory has investigated the impact of different types of discrepancies on motivation, emotional vulnerability, self-esteem, and information processing. A smaller portion of research has been devoted to the relation between self-standards and mechanisms of self-regulation. However, the dynamics of the relation between the actual-

self and the self-guides has not been explored and this is the focus of the present study.

Is the actual-self independent from the self-guides

Self-discrepancy theory discusses the actual-self and self-guides as two discrete mental representations, fairly autonomous from one another, involved in an ongoing comparative process. This assumption is implicit in the measure developed on the basis of the theory - a questionnaire that measures the actual-self independently from the self-guides. An alternative view would argue that the actual-self is derived from the self-guides. From this perspective, the actual-self remains attached to the guides so that changes in the actual-self would reflect changes in the accessibility of guides. If this were the case, the actual-self would be constantly redefined as a result of the accessibility of different guides.

The current study investigated this idea of a fluid actual-self. Fluidity of the actual-self refers to the extent to which the actual-self changes in reference to the self-guides. That is, the actual-self may change depending on what guides are most salient (e.g., primed) at a given point in time. For example, when an individual's beliefs about how others perceive him/her as a parent are salient, (i.e., primed) we would expect the individual to identify his/her actual-self in reference to this specific standard (e.g., they may identify themselves as a good parent, nurturing, supportive, loving, etc.). However, if the

individual's own beliefs as a parent are primed we may expect him/her to evaluate him/herself somewhat differently, specifically in a way that corresponds to their perceptions of the kind of parent they would like to be (i.e., tolerant, demanding, devoting more time to children, etc.).

Other contemporary theories that also concentrate on the evaluative role of the self-system, have identified various aspects of the self that seem to be related to changes and stability of behaviour. Like self-discrepancy theory, theories of self-awareness (Duval & Wicklund, 1972) and self-consciousness (Carver & Scheier, 1978) state that people compare their actual behaviour to ideals, and more specifically to standards that are salient at a given moment in time. The present study attempts to assess whether such predispositions, specifically self-consciousness, have a moderating effect on the changes in the construction of the self-concept after different self-guides have been activated.

Private and Public Self-Consciousness

Fenigstein, Scheier and Buss (1975) identified two aspects of the self in relation to self-consciousness. A *private* component comprised of the inner, personal, autonomous and covert aspects of the self, and a *public* component that refers to the social, overtly displayed aspects of the self. These two domains of the self are considered to be fairly independent from one another, and also appear as stable predispositions. Some people focus

mainly on one of the two self-domains, some people are inclined to focus on both domains, while some tend not to focus on either domain. Research has demonstrated that private self-consciousness predicts the tendency to make self-focused responses on a sentence completion blank (Carver and Scheier, 1978). Private self-consciousness has also been associated with reports of more intense moods. People high in private self-consciousness are happier when they succeed, more enraged when angered, and more depressed after failure (Buss, 1980).

Scheier and Carver (1980) examined the impact of private and public self-consciousness on dissonance reduction. Private self-consciousness, induced or measured as a chronic predisposition, was associated with an approach to dissonance reduction that involved minimal attitude change. In contrast, public self-consciousness was associated with a dissonance reduction style that entailed attitude change.

People high in private consciousness were found to resist group pressure more successfully than people scoring low in private consciousness (Froming & Craver, 1981). People high in public self-consciousness were found to be more inclined to perceive social situations as relevant to themselves or targeted toward themselves than people low in public self-consciousness (Fenigstein, 1984).

The above-mentioned findings highlight the importance of evaluating the influence of self-aspects such as private

and public self-consciousness on the changes in the self-concept occurring as a result of activating own versus other guides.

The Study

The purpose of the current study was to investigate the degree of stability of the actual-self, and the degree to which it is fluid. More specifically, we approached this by examining the effect of priming self-guides on the construction of the actual-self.

The current study addressed the following issues:

First, we investigated the idea that the actual-self is anchored primarily in one's own self-guides when the context is 'neutral' and no particular perspective of the self is activated.

Secondly, we examined the moderating effect of individual differences in the tendency to attend primarily to one's public, or private aspects on the construction of the actual-self. That is, we predicted that for individuals high in private self-consciousness the actual-self would be more strongly anchored in the own guides. In contrast, for individuals high in public self-consciousness the set of other self-guides would have primacy and serve as an anchor point for their actual-self.

Thirdly, we examined the notion that the relation between the actual-self and the self-guides is dynamic. Two sets of self-guides were primed: own self-guides and other self-guides. Own self-guides refer to the individuals'

beliefs of how they would ideally like to be and how they feel they ought to be. Other self-guides refer to individuals' beliefs about how other people would like them to be, or how other people feel they ought to be. We compared the degree of relatedness between the actual-self and the primed self-guide to the degree of relatedness between the actual-self and the unprimed self-guide. Based on the idea that the actual-self is anchored to the self-guides, we expected a higher degree of relatedness between the actual-self and a self-guide when the self-guide was primed than at a time when the self-guide was not primed.

Specifically, when an individual's other self-guides were primed we anticipated the actual-self to be constructed in relation to the other self-guide representations. We expected this to be reflected in a higher proportion of related attributes between the actual-self and the other self-guides after they were primed.

On the other hand, taking into account the idea of the primacy of one's own guides, we expected only a moderate increase in the proportion of related attributes between the actual-self and the activated set of own guides.

Our final prediction stated that people who scored high in Private self-consciousness and were predisposed to define their actual-self on the basis of their own standards would be less influenced by the other prime manipulation than people high in Public self-consciousness.

Additional exploratory predictions

There is a growing body of literature that points to gender differences in the development and construction of the self-system for men and women (Chodorow, 1978; Gilligan, 1982; McGuire, 1984; Rein & Moretti, 1993). More specifically, these contemporary theories suggest that women are socialized to be more concerned with interpersonal relatedness than men. Therefore, the social aspect of the self-system seems to take the upper hand in the way women construct their self-concept. For example, in a study exploring gender differences in the social self McGuire (1984) found that mentions of significant others comprised 24% of the content for girls and only 17% of the content for boys. Similarly, the results from a study investigating relational models of depression in women (Rein & Moretti, 1993) indicated that unlike men, women tended to meet others' standards rather than own standards.

These findings suggest that it may be important to explore gender differences in the relation between the actual-self and the self-guides in the present study. More precisely, we expected that women would be more responsive to activation of other self-guides than men. We predicted that for women, but not for men, this would lead to an increase in the proportion of related attributes between the actual-self and other guides in the other prime condition.

Method

Participants

Participants were 109 psychology undergraduates enrolled at SFU. Subjects were given course credit for their participation. The sample consisted of forty-four females and forty-one males after twenty-four subjects dropped out in the second phase of the study.

Materials

Selves Questionnaire (Appendix 1). The Selves Questionnaire (Higgins et al, 1986) comprises three lists of traits and attributes that subjects generate to describe their actual-self (i.e. attributes they believe they actually possess), the ideal self (attributes they ideally wished to or hoped to possess), and ought self (i.e. attributes they believe they should or ought to possess). A second section of the Selves Questionnaire included traits and attributes that subjects believed their mother and father wished or hoped they possessed (ideal-other) and feel they should or ought to possess (ought-other). Subjects also rated the extent to which they believed they possess (actual-self), wish they possessed (ideal-self), or feel they should possess (ought-self) each self-state attribute on a scale from 1 (slightly) to 4 (extremely).

There are four types of attribute relationships that reflect relatedness between the actual-self and a self-guide. When an actual-self attribute and a self-guide

attribute are synonymous (as defined by Roget's Thesaurus) and differ in their extent ratings by no more than 1, the two attributes represent a *match*. When attributes are synonymous to each other, but differ in their extent ratings by more than 1, they are defined as a *mismatch of extent*. Attributes that are antonyms are defined as a *mismatch*. Matches and mismatches (synonymous, or antonymous) are an indication of a relation between the actual-self and a guide. Attribute pairs that are neither synonyms, nor antonyms are defined as a *nonmatch* (Strauman & Higgins, 1988). Nonmatches indicate the lack of a relation between the actual-self and a self-guide.

Scoring

The primary researcher followed scoring procedures used in previous discrepancy research when scoring the Selves Questionnaire. A research assistant scored independently 20 randomly selected questionnaires already scored by the primary researcher. The overall interrater reliability (intraclass correlation) was .90 when calculated on independent observations. However, actual scoring involves dependent observations (an attribute listed consistently across several self-guides). When dependent observations were included, interrater reliability was .87. The raters resolved their disagreements through discussions.

Each participant received a score for the number of matches and the number of mismatches between the actual-self attributes and the attributes of own and other guides in

Time 1 and Time 2. Collapsing across these variables that reflect relatedness between the actual-self and the various self-guides (matches and mismatches) provided two composite scores of *own* relatedness and *other* relatedness. These scores were obtained as proportions of *own* and *other* related attributes respectively out of the total number of attributes.

Nonmatches comprised approximately 60% of the attributes. Previous research on a comparable sample of subjects cites 55% and 62% of nonmatches (Strauman & Higgins, 1988; Strauman, Higgins, Vookles, Berenstein & Chaiken, 1991).

Public and Private Self-Consciousness

Self-Consciousness Scale (Appendix 2). Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss (1975) constructed a scale to assess individual differences in self-consciousness. The scale consists of 23 items measuring three basic factors of self-consciousness - public self-consciousness, private self-consciousness, and social anxiety. Private self-consciousness refers to the tendency to think and reflect about one's inner self and is measured by items such as "I am always trying to figure myself out". Public self-consciousness refers to the tendency to be aware of oneself as a social object and is assessed by items such as "I'm concerned about what other people think of me". Each item is rated on a scale of 0 (extremely uncharacteristic) to 4 (extremely characteristic). The factor of social anxiety is

not within the scope of interest of the present study and the social anxiety subscale was excluded from the SCS.

The three subscales are not highly correlated suggesting that the SCS is factorially sound, and the test-retest reliability for the total scale is .80 (Fenistingen et al., 1975). Carver and Glass (1976) concluded that the private and public self-consciousness subscales of the SCS have good discriminant validity, because they were relatively free from associations with five potentially contaminating variables - intelligence, need for achievement, test anxiety, activity level, and sociability. A number of research studies have demonstrated the construct validity of the scale (Scheier & Carver, 1980; Froming & Carver, 1981; Fenigstein 1984).

Procedure

Participants were recruited at the end of a lecture, and were told that subjects were needed for a study on personality. The primary researcher explained that participants would complete several questionnaires at that time, and that the researchers would return in four to six weeks for another questionnaire session.

In phase one all subjects participated as a group. Each participant received an envelope containing a consent form and the above-mentioned questionnaires. First, they were presented with a consent form that outlined the purpose of the study, emphasized the anonymity and confidentiality of the results. The consent form also instructed participants

that they should feel free to ask questions at any time during the research and that they could discontinue participation at any time. Participants filled out the *Self-Consciousness* scale first. The actual-self section of the *Selves Questionnaire* was administered next, and followed by the administration of the self-guides section of the *Selves-Questionnaire*. *Parental guides* were used for the 'other' standpoint.

Four weeks later the primary researcher and a research assistant returned to the same class and at the end of the lecture carried out phase two of the study. The time lapse was designed to reduce the likelihood that subjects would describe their actual-self by trying to recall their earlier answers. Subjects were randomly assigned to a condition of *Own-guides Prime*, or a condition of *Other-guides Prime*. The primes required subjects to write for 5 minutes a paragraph describing the standards or ideals they or others had for them. For example, participants in the *Own-guides prime* received an envelope that contained a front-sheet that asked subjects to write a paragraph describing the wishes, goals and aspirations they held for themselves. Similarly, participants in the *The Other-guides prime* found a front-sheet in the envelope containing questionnaires, and were asked to write a paragraph on the wishes, goals and aspirations their parents held for them. Following priming, the actual-self section of the *Selves Questionnaire* was administered. Finally, subjects filled out the self-guides

section of the Selves Questionnaire. Participants were then debriefed individually by the primary researcher and two research assistants.

Results

Attrition

Participants were divided into two groups -- those who participated in phase one of the study (1) $n=109$ and those who participated in the two phases of the study (2) $n=24$.

A one-way ANOVA on the Public Self-Consciousness scores was performed for the two groups. There was no significant main effect, $F(1, 108) = .402$, $p > .1$. A one-way ANOVA on the Private Self-Consciousness scores did not demonstrate a significant main effect, $F(1, 108) = .466$, $p > .1$. The results indicate that the two groups did not differ on Self-Consciousness.

A one-way ANOVA on own-related attributes for the two groups yielded a significant main effect, $F(1, 105) = 4.351$, $p < .04$. Subjects who participated in the two phases of the study had a higher proportion of own-related attributes ($M=.29$) than participants who took part only in the first part of the study ($M=.18$). However, an Eta-squared measure of the magnitude of effect indicated the size of the difference was not large, (eta-squared = .04.)

A one-way ANOVA on other-related attributes for the two groups yielded a significant main effect, $F(1, 105) =$

4.104, $p < .05$. Subjects who participated in the two phases of the study had a higher proportion of *other*-related attributes ($M=.21$) than participants who took part only in the first part of the study ($M=.12$). The eta-squared statistic indicated that the magnitude of effect was not large, (eta-squared = .04).

Although participants who dropped out from the second stage of the study differed on two dependent variables from participants who completed the two stages of the research, the results showed that there is no threat to the internal validity of the study, since the effect size of these differences was small.

Primacy of own self-guides in constructing the actual-self

Table 1 presents the mean proportions of related attributes between the actual-self and *own* self-guides and the actual-self and *other* self-guides from Time 1 data. As the results indicate, the proportion of *own*-related attributes is higher ($M=.27$) than the proportion of *other*-related attributes ($M=.19$), $t(105) = 6.48$ $p < .000$. These findings confirm the first prediction that the actual-self is anchored in one's own standards in the absence of experimental manipulation.

 Insert Table 1 about here

Self-consciousness as a moderator variable in the relation between actual-self representations and standpoints of the self

Subjects were divided into high and low on public and private Self-Consciousness by a median split. Table 2 presents the means, standard deviations and medians for self-consciousness. Cross-tabulating the two subscales, we obtained four groups - people who scored high in both private and public self-consciousness (Both), people who scored low in both private and public self-consciousness (None), people who scored high in public and low in private self-consciousness (Public), and people who scored high in private and low in public self-consciousness (Private). Table 3 presents the number of subjects in each group.

Insert tables 2 & 3 about here

Our prediction stated that people who were privately oriented would construct their actual-self more in relation to own self-guides than people who were publicly oriented. We expected this to be expressed in a higher proportion of related attributes between the actual-self and own self-guides for people scoring high in Private self-consciousness than for people scoring high in Public self-consciousness. In contrast, for individuals high in Public self-consciousness we expected the set of other self-guides to be more salient when constructing their actual-self and

predicted a higher proportion of related attributes between the actual-self and other self-guides.

To test this prediction, we performed a 2 X 4 ANOVA on own-related and other-related attributes. Standpoint [Own-Relatedness/Other-Relatedness] was a within-subjects factor and Self-consciousness [Public/Private/None/Both] was a between-subjects factor. The main effect for Self-consciousness was not significant, $F(3, 102) = 1.07, p > .1$. A significant main effect for Standpoint was demonstrated, $F(3, 102) = 44.94, p < .000$. The Standpoint X Self-consciousness interaction was not significant $F(3, 102) = 1.20, p > .1$.

As indicated in Table 4, participants in all four groups of Self-consciousness had a higher proportion of own-related attributes than other-related attributes. The main effect for Standpoint indicates that there was a higher proportion of related attributes for the actual-self and own self-guides than for the actual-self and other self-guides.

This finding demonstrates the definite primacy of the own standpoint, regardless of self-consciousness.

 Insert Table 4 about here

Changes in the actual-self as a function of Priming the self-guides

A 2 [Standpoint] X 2 [Manipulation] X 2 [Time] mixed model ANOVA was conducted on the proportions of own-related

and other-related attributes. Time was the repeated factor, Standpoint (Own-relatedness/Other-relatedness) was a within-subjects factor and Manipulation (Own Prime/Other Prime) was a between-subjects factor. A significant main effect for Time was revealed, $F(1,80) = 8.11, p < .006$. The main effect for Manipulation approached significance, $F(1,80) = 2.68, p < .11$. A significant Standpoint X Time interaction was revealed, $F(1,80) = 12.04, p < .001$. The interaction effect between Standpoint, Time and Manipulation approached significance, $F(1,80) = 2.52, p < .12$.

The results suggest that the actual-self changed in reference to the self-guides over time across the manipulation conditions. We further examined the planned specific predictions for each manipulation condition.

Priming other self-guides

It was hypothesized that the actual-self would be constructed in relation to the other self-guides when these guides were primed. We expected this to be reflected in a higher proportion of related attributes between the actual-self and the other self-guides at Time 2 than at Time 1. As indicated in Table 5, the increase in the number of other related attributes to the actual-self at Time 2 was larger than the increase of own related attributes at Time 2 for participants in the Other-Prime condition.

Insert Table 5 about here

A repeated measures ANOVA on the proportions of own-related and other-related attributes for subjects in the Other Prime Condition with Standpoint as a within-subjects factor was performed. A significant main-effect for Time was revealed, $F(1,42) = 9.70$, $p < .003$. There was no significant main effect for Standpoint, $F(1,42) = 1.57$, $p < .22$. The analysis indicated a significant Standpoint X Time interaction, $F(1,42) = 7.26$, $p < .01$.

Planned comparisons¹ showed that the proportion of other-related attributes increased significantly at Time 2, in comparison to Time 1, $t(42) = -3.37$, $p < .02$.² On the other hand, the proportion of own-related attributes did not change significantly over time, $t(43) = -1.03$, $p > .1$.

Priming own self-guides

The hypothesis stated that since the amount of relatedness between the actual-self and one's own set of self-guides has a high base-line, we expected a moderate increase in the number of related attributes between the actual-self and the own-guides as a result of the Own-Prime manipulation.

A repeated measures ANOVA on the proportions of own-related and other-related attributes for subjects in the Own Prime Condition with Standpoint (Own-relatedness/Other-relatedness) as a within-subjects factor was performed. The main effect for Time approached significance, $F(1,38) = 3.06$, $p < .09$. There was no significant main effect for

Standpoint, $F(1, 38) = .78, p > .1$. A significant Standpoint X Time interaction was revealed, $F(1,38) = 6.70, p < .01$.

Planned comparisons showed that the increase of *own*-related attributes over time was not significant, $t(44) = .12, p > .1$. Contrary to our prediction, there was a significant increase in the proportion of other-related attributes from Time 1 to Time 2, $t(38) = 2.24, p < .03$.³

These findings indicate that priming *own* guides is associated with a significant increase in the degree of relatedness between the actual-self and the set of other self-guides.⁴ Table 6 presents the means of *own*-related attributes and *other*-related attributes at Time 1 and Time 2 for participants in Own-Prime condition.

Insert Table 6 about here

Self-consciousness as a moderator in changes in the self system

The basic prediction stated that participants classified as scoring high on Private and low on Public self-consciousness, would be less likely to modify the construction of their actual-self as a result of priming other guides than participants who scored high on Public self-consciousness and low on Private self-consciousness.

A 2 x 2 x 4 ANOVA on the proportion of *own* related and *other* related attributes was performed with Time as a within-subjects variable. Manipulation (Own Prime/Other Prime) and Self-Consciousness (Public/Private) were between-subjects variables. A significant main effect for Time was demonstrated, $F(3,78) = 7.21, p < .02$. There was a significant Standpoint X Time simple effect, $F(3,78) = 11.12, p < .001$. No other significant main effects, or interactions were revealed. The three-way interaction for Manipulation X Consciousness X Time was not significant, $F(3, 78) = 1.09, p > .1$.

The results indicate that people's orientation to attend to their private, or public aspects did not moderate the changes occurring in the self-system over time.

Exploratory analyses

We predicted that for women, but not for men, there would be an increase in the proportion of related attributes between the actual-self and *other* guides in the Other Prime condition. We investigated the more specific patterns of change in the self-system for men and women by exploring the categories that were most susceptible to change (matches versus mismatches), as well as the domain of standpoint (*own* versus *other*).

Table 7 and Table 8 indicate that there is a high degree of stability in the category of mismatches both for

own-related and other-related attributes for subjects in the two experimental conditions.

For the category of *own*-related matches women in the Own Prime condition displayed a high degree of stability, ($M1(22) = 3.46$ & $M2(22) = 3.48$). On the other hand, for men in the Own Prime condition, the proportion of *own*-related matches increased at Time 2, ($M1(22) = 2.57$ & $M2(22) = 3.66$). The two-tailed *t*-test performed on the mean difference score of *own*-matches from Time 1 and Time 2 for men and women in the Own Prime condition was statistically significant, $t(42) = 2.20$, $p < .03$. The *t*-test performed on the difference score from Time 1 and Time 2 for *own*-related matches in the Other Prime condition did not suggest any significant differences between males and females, $t(40) = -.88$, $p > .1$, (Figure 1).

Insert Figure 1 about here

For the category of *other*-related matches, as indicated in Table 8, women in the Other Prime condition responded with an increase in the number of *other*-related matches ($M1(21) = 2.28$ & $M2(21) = 3.36$). Men in the Other Prime condition displayed stability in the category of *other*-related matches when constructing their actual-self ($M1(21)$

= 2.25 & $M2(21) = 2.28$). The two-tailed t-test on the mean difference score of other-related matches for males and females indicated that this difference was statistically significant, $t(40) = -2.02$, $p < .05$. The t-test performed on the difference score from Time 1 and Time 2 for other-related matches in the Own Prime Condition did not suggest any significant differences between males and females, $t(40) = .61$, $p > .1$, (Figure 2).⁵

Insert Figure 2 about here

To summarize, the results from the exploratory analyses confirmed the prediction that women are sensitive to activation of the *other* self-guides and are inclined to construct their actual-selves in relation to standards they believe significant others hold for them. For men, on the other hand, the salience of one's *own* guides seems to accentuate the degree of congruency between the actual-self and one's own standards.

Discussion

The objective of the current study was to assess the extent to which the content of the actual-self is related to the self-guides. Furthermore, we investigated the issue of

changes occurring in the construction of the actual-self as a result of the accessibility of own versus other guides.

Own standards as the primary anchor of the actual-self

The results confirmed our primary hypothesis that the actual-self is anchored in one's own standards if no other particular self-guide is made accessible. As predicted, the proportions of related attributes between the actual-self and *own* guides was significantly higher than the proportion of related attributes between the actual-self and other guides. In other words, individuals' self-descriptions tend to be more closely related to internal standards that they hold as personally important, than to standards they believe others hold for them. This finding is consistent with assumptions of other theories stating that people define themselves less in terms of other people as they become older (McGuire, 1984).

Stability of the self-system

The degree of relatedness between the actual-self and *own* guides remained stable over time, regardless of whether we primed *own*, or other self-guides. This suggests that the core of the self-concept that is etymologically related to internal personal standards is rather stable. Furthermore, the results from the current study demonstrated that the stability of this aspect of the self-concept was not affected by individuals' tendency to attend to their private, or public aspects of the self.

Fluidity of the self-system

With regard to the association between the actual-self and *other* self-guides, the results suggest a more dynamic relationship. We failed to confirm the specificity of change in relatedness. Over time the relatedness between the actual-self and the other self-guides increased in the two experimental conditions.

One possible interpretation is that accessibility of self-guides in general led to an increased degree of relatedness between people's self-descriptions and the standards they believe significant others hold for them.

If this were the case, this finding raises an important question about the influence the interpersonal domain has on individuals' evaluative aspect of the self-system. In hindsight, the finding is not surprising when we consider that people's beliefs and evaluations of themselves can be traced developmentally back to the interactions with others (Bowlby, 1982; Kohut, 1971; McGuire, 1984; Rogers, 1951; Sullivan, 1953). Intimate relationships, such as the ones with the immediate family, have the most profound impact on the development of the self-system. Therefore, the choice of parents as significant others in this study might be one explanation why activating *own* standards in the self-system resulted in an augmentation of the degree of relatedness between the actual-self and *other* guides.

Gender differences in the construction of the actual-self

Our exploratory analyses suggested that the dynamics of the relation between the actual-self and the self-guides, as described so far, is different for men and women. The results indicated that women were more sensitive than men to the accessibility of *other* guides. They responded to the activation of *other* guides with an increase of matching attributes between the actual-self and other-guides. Men, on the other hand, were found to be more sensitive than women to the accessibility of *own* standards. Priming of *own* guides resulted in an increased degree of relatedness between men's self-descriptions and their own self-guides.

These results replicate preliminary findings from self-discrepancy research that suggest gender differences in the organization of the self-system. Rein and Moretti (1993) found that women's sense of self was more congruent with how they thought others wanted them to be, while men's sense of self was more congruent with the standards they held for themselves.

Contributions of the current research

A unique contribution of the present study is that it directly investigates the relation between the actual-self and the standpoint dimension of the self-discrepancy model. Self-discrepancy research to date has primarily emphasized the importance of distinguishing between the ideal and the ought domain of the self-system. The significance of others'

perspectives on the self is implied in a few studies, but only within the context of ideal versus ought discrepancies (Higgins, Bond, Strauman, & Klein; Moretti & Higgins, 1990; Strauman & Higgins, 1988).

A recent trend in the literature has highlighted the theoretical and clinical benefits of integrating social-cognitive and psychodynamic perspectives on the self (Moretti, 1992; Westen, 1992). Researchers have emphasized that applying cognitive research technology to test psychodynamic constructs is a necessary step towards the integration of the two perspectives. The results of the current study underscore the importance of interpersonal information in the way people describe themselves, and provide empirical support for the relevance of the psychodynamic and object relations interpersonal conceptions of the self (Bowlby, 1982; Kohut, 1971; Rogers, 1951; Sullivan, 1953). Methodologically, this study presents an illustration that modern research techniques can be utilized successfully when investigating deep structures such as the self .

Finally, this study makes a contribution to a more philosophical debate in the literature that discusses the paradoxical nature of the self (see Strauman, 1989, for more detailed discussion). Our findings indicate that it is possible to view the self as a dialectic synthesis of static and malleable aspects. Findings such as these will allow social scientists to synthesize extreme theoretical beliefs

about the self as either a stable unit (Kihlstrom & Cantor, 1984; Wylie, 1974), or a constantly changeable entity (Gergen, 1982).

Limitations of the current study and suggestions for future research

The present research is limited by a number of factors.

The priming manipulation did not work entirely as predicted. This implies that the changes observed in the relation between the actual-self and the set of other self-guides might be due to effects of repeated testing, or maturation. To help rule out this possibility, future research needs to include a no-prime control group, and/or a manipulation check measure.

Another limitation of the research, also related to the issue of testing effects, involves the fact that the self-guides were measured in the same order for all participants. In case a replication of the current research is attempted, ideal/own, ought/own, significant other/ideal and ought guides need to be administered in a counterbalanced order.

Activating own standards led to an increased relatedness between the actual-self and other standards. This effect might have been a result of priming parental guides. Future research should investigate whether activating internalized standards of significant others outside of one's family, i.e. activating the more social

aspect of the self-system, would produce a similar pattern of relatedness between own and other guides.

In addition, the priming manipulation used in the present study was based solely on the internal representations participants had of a significant other. Thus, employing a priming procedure that involves real input from others or their presence will be crucial in future research that attempts to test the effects of priming on the self-system. One such design might include the participation of couples, where 'other' prime will be a discussion of the expectations each partner holds for the other partner with regard to an issue identified by the couple as important.

Following the same line of reasoning, we need to interpret the results suggesting gender differences in the construction of the self-concept with caution. It is possible that asking people to write about their own hopes and expectations, or those that others hold for them, led participants to focus more intensely on the self-guides than they would in a 'real-life' situation. Therefore, future research is needed before we conclude that: a) women tend to define themselves in harmony with the standards they believe significant others hold for them, and b) men define themselves in unison with the standards they hold for themselves.

Another fruitful line of research that will throw light into the issue of gender differences and the construction of the self, might be using a population of immigrants. Some

anecdotal evidence suggests that female immigrants from Western-like cultures tend to adapt faster to the requirements of a new cultural environment and experience less psychological discomfort, compared to men. It is worthwhile to test this hypothesis empirically in view of our findings that women are more inclined to construct their actual-self in congruence with others.

The changes of the actual-self observed in this study are best interpreted as a change in the accessibility of actual-self material in reference to the self-guides after they have been activated. To examine changes in the content of the actual-self, would require a comparison of actual-self measures taken at different times, independent of the relation between the actual-self and the self-guides.

Summary

Despite the potential limitations of the present research, the findings outline a trend that has already been suggested in the recent literature of the self (Markus & Kunda, 1986). Namely, that we have a core of ourselves that is enduring and seems to provide us with a sense of continuity. The current results imply that this more stable aspect of ourselves is moored mostly in values we have internalized as personally important. At the same time, a more social part of ourselves fluctuates over time, and is possibly shaped by the varying situational context. Furthermore, there is an indication that men and women may respond in a different manner to the changing environment.

he changes in the self-system were greater for women when the context highlighted the standpoint of *other*. Men responded with changes in the self-system when the their own standards were made salient by the context.

REFERENCES

- Anderson, J.R. (1982). Acquisition of cognitive skill. Psychological Review. 89, 369-406.
- Buss, A.H. (1980). Self-consciousness and social anxiety. San Francisco:Freeman.
- Carver, C.S. & Scheier, M.F. (1978). Self-focusing effects of dispositional self-consciousness, mirror presence and audience presence. Journal of Personality and Social psychology , 36, 324-332.
- Carver, C.S. & Glass, D.C. (1976). The self-consciousness scale: a discriminant validity study. Journal of Personality Assessment, 40, 2, 169-172.
- Carver, C. S. & Scheier, M.F. (1985). Aspects of self and the control of behaviour. In Schlenker, B.(Eds.). The Self and Social Life. McGraw-Hill, Inc.
- Carver, C.S. & Scheier, M.F. (1978). The blind man and the elephant: Selective examination of the public-private literature gives rise to a faulty perception. Journal of Personality, 55.
- Chodorow, N. (1978). The reproduction of mothering: Psychoanalysis and the sociology of gender. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Cooley, C. H. (1902). Human nature and social order. New York: Scribners.
- Duval, S., & Wicklund, R. A. (1972). A theory of objective self-awareness. New York: Academic Press.

- Fenigstein, A., Scheier, M. F., & Buss, A. H. (1975). Public and private self-consciousness: Assessment and theory. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 43, 522-527.
- Froming, W. J., & Carver, C. S. (1981). Divergent influences of public and private self-consciousness in a compliance paradigm. Journal of Research in Personality, 15, 159-171.
- Gergen, K. J. (1982). Towards transformation in social knowledge. New York: Springer-Verlag.
- Gergen, K. J. (1984). Theory of the self: Impasse and evolution. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 17, 49-101.
- Gilligan, C. (1982). In a different voice: Psychological theory and women's development. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Higgins, E.T. (1987). Self-discrepancy theory: A theory relating self and affect. Psychological Review, 94, 319-340.
- Higgins, E.T. (1989a). Knowledge accessibility and activation: Subjectivity and suffering from unconscious sources. Unintended thought: The limits of awareness, intention, and control. J.S.Uleman & J.A.Bargh (Eds.). New York: Guilford.
- Higgins, E.T. (1989b). Continuities and discontinuities in self-regulatory and self-evaluative processes: A

developmental theory relating self and affect. Journal of Personality, 57:2, 407-439.

Higgins, E.T. & Bargh, J.A. (1987). Social Cognition and Social perception. In M.R. Rosenzweig & L.W. Porter (Eds). Annual Review of Psychology (vol. 38, pp.369-425). Palo Alto, CA: Annual reviews.

Higgins, E.T., Bond, R.N., Klein, R., & Strauman, T. (1986). Self-discrepancies and emotional vulnerabilities: How magnitude, accessibility and type of discrepancy influence affect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 5-15.

Higgins, E.T., Hymes, C., & Roney, C. (1992). Ideal versus ought predilections for types of regulatory forms. Unpublished manuscript.

Higgins, E.T., Klein, R., & Strauman, T. (1985). Self-concept discrepancy theory: A psychological model for distinguishing among different aspects of depression and anxiety. Social Cognition, 3, 51-76.

Higgins, E.T. & Moretti, M., 1988. Standard utilization and the self-evaluative process: Vulnerability to types of aberrant beliefs. Delusional Beliefs. T.F. Oltmanns & B.A. Maher (Eds.), pp. (110-137). New York: Wiley and Sons.

Higgins, E.T., Strauman, T., & Klein, R. (1986). Standards and the process of evaluation: Multiple affects from multiple stages. Handbook of motivation and cognitions: Foundations of social behaviour. R.M. Sorrentino &

- E.T.Higgins, (Eds.). New York: Guilford Press.
- Higgins, E.T., Van Hook, E. & Dorfman, D., 1988. Do self-attributes form a cognitive structure? Social Cognition, 6, 177-207.
- Horney, K. (1937). Our inner conflicts. New York.
- Kihlstrom, J.F., & Cantor, N. (1984). Mental representations of the self. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 17, 1-47.
- Kohut, H. (1971). The Analysis of the Self: A Systematic Approach to the Psychoanalytic Treatment of Narcissistic Personality Disorders. New York: International Universities Press.
- James, W. (1890). The principles of psychology (vol.1). New York: Henry Holt & Co.
- Linville, P. W. (1985). Self-complexity and affective extremity: Don't put all your eggs in one cognitive basket. Social Cognition, 3, 94-120.
- Markus, H. (1977). Self-schemata and processing information about the self. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35, 63-78.
- Marcus, H. & Kunda, Z. (1986). Stability and malleability of the self-concept. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 4, 858-866.
- Markus, H. & Ruvolo, A. (1988). Possible selves: personalized representations of goals. Goal concepts in personality and social psychology. L. Pervin (Eds.). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. (pp 211-242).

- Markus, H. & Wurf, E. (1987). The dynamic self-concept: A social psychological perspective. Annual Review of Psychology, 38, 299-337.
- McGuire, W.J. (1984). Search for the self: Going beyond self-esteem and the reactive self. Personality and the Prediction of Behaviour. Zucker, Aronoff, & Rabin (Eds). Academic Press, (73-115).
- Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, self and society from the standpoint of a social behaviourist. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Moretti, M.M.(1992a). Self-discrepancy, mood and interpersonal functioning. Paper presented at the Canadian Psychological Association, Annual Convention, Quebec City.
- Moretti, M.M.(1992b). Integrating the psychodynamic and cognitive selves. Psychological Inquiry, vol.3, 1, 47-50.
- Moretti, M.M. & Higgins, E.T. (1990). Relating self-discrepancy to self-esteem: The contribution of self discrepancy beyond actual-self ratings. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 26, 108-123.
- Moretti, M.M., & Higgins, E.T. (1990). The development of self-system vulnerabilities: Social and cognitive factors in developmental psychopathology. R.J.Sternberg & J.Kolliqan (Eds.), Competence considered. New Haven, CT :Yale University Press.

- Rein, A. & Moretti, M. (1993). Towards an understanding of self-representations in depressed women. Unpublished master's thesis, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, Canada.
- Rogers, C.R. (1965). Client-Centered Therapy. Boston: Houghton Mifflin & Company.
- Rogers, T. B. (1981). A model of the self as an aspect of the human information processing system. Kantor & Kihlstrom.
- Roney, C.J.R. & Sorrentino, R. (1992). Reducing self-discrepancies or maintaining self-congruence?: Uncertainty orientation and self-regulation. Unpublished manuscript.
- Scheier, M. F. & Carver, C. S. (1980). Private and public self-attention, resistance to change, and dissonance reduction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39, 3, 390-405.
- Strauman, T.J. (1989). Self-discrepancies in clinical depression and social phobia: Cognitive structures that underlie emotional disorders? Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 98, 14-22.
- Strauman, T.J. & Higgins, T.E. (1987). Automatic activation of self-discrepancies and emotional syndromes: When cognitive structures influence affect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53, 1004-1014.
- Strauman, T.J. & Higgins, T.E. (1988). Self-discrepancies as predictors of vulnerability to distinct syndromes of

chronic emotional distress. Journal of Personality,
56, 685-707.

Strauman, T.J., Higgins, T.E., Vookles, J., Berenstein, V. &
Chaiken, S. (1991). Self-discrepancies and vulnerability
to body dissatisfaction and disordered eating. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, vol.61, No. 6,
946-956.

Sullivan, H.S. (1953). The Interpersonal Theory of
Psychiatry. New York: Norton & Company.

VanHook, E., & Higgins, E.T. (1988). Self-related problems
beyond the self-concept: Motivational consequences of
discrepant self-guides. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 55, 625-633.

Westen, D. (1992). The cognitive self and the psychoanalytic
self: Can we put ourselves together? Psychological
Inquiry, vol.3, 1, 1-13.

Wylie, R. (1974). The self-concept: A review of
methodological considerations and measuring
instruments. Rev. ed. Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska
Press.

Footnotes

- 1 The comparisons did not use the error term of the ANOVA analyses. Instead, independent t-tests were performed.
- 2 One participant did not provide data for father self-guide and was excluded from this analysis.
- 3 Six participants did not provide data for parental self-guides and were not included in this analysis.
- 4 Because the correlation between own-related attributes and other-related attributes in the sample of the current study was significant, (Time 1 $r(106) = .84$, $p < .001$; Time 2 $r(82) = .53$, $p < .001$), we repeated the above analyses with residualized scores for each dependent variable (i.e. own-relatedness controlling for its relation with other-relatedness; other-relatedness controlling for its relation with own-relatedness). The results obtained from the analyses with residualized scores for the dependent variables were comparable to the results obtained with the non-residualized scores.
- 5 These analyses were repeated using proportional data. The results were comparable to the analyses using raw data.

Table 1

Mean Proportions of Related Attributes between the Actual-self and Own Self-guides and the Actual-self and Other Self-Guides in Time1

	Mean	SD
OWN-RELATED	.27	.22
OTHER-RELATED	.19	.18

Note: n=106

* $p < .000$

Table 2

Means, Standard Deviations and Medians for Public and Private Self-Consciousness

	<u>M</u>	<u>SD</u>	<u>MEDIAN</u>
PUBLIC SELF- CONSCIOUSNESS	19.5	.47	20.0
PRIVATE SELF- CONSCIOUSNESS	17.6	.49	17.0

Table 3

Self-Consciousness Groups

PUBLIC SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS			
		LOW	HIGH
PRIVATE SELF- CONSCIOUSNESS	LOW	33	22
	HIGH	24	30

Table 4

Mean Proportions of Related Attributes between Actual-self
and Own and Other self-guides for Self-Consciousness Groups

	None		Public		Private		Both	
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD
Own-related Attributes	.29	.23	.28	.26	.32	.24	.21	.17
Other-related Attributes	.23	.22	.17	.16	.22	.23	.15	.11
	(33)		(22)		(23)		(28)	

n = 106.

Table 5

Mean Proportions of related attributes between Actual-self and Other-guides & Actual-self and Own-guides at Time1 and Time2 for Other-Prime Condition

OTHER-PRIME

	TIME1		TIME2	
	M	SD	M	SD
OWN-RELATED	.21	.10	.24	.11
OTHER-RELATED	.14	.11	.27*	.26

Note: n=44

* $p < .02$.

Table 6

Mean Proportions of related attribues between the Actual-self and Other-guides & the Actual-self and Own-guides at Time 1 and Time 2 for Own-Prime Condition

OWN PRIME

	TIME1		TIME2	
	<u>M</u>	<u>SD</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>SD</u>
OWN-RELATED	.34	.26	.33	.26
OTHER-RELATED	.20	.16	.44*	.75

Note: $n=45$

* $p < .03$.

Table 7.A

Means of Own-related Matches and Own-related Mismatches for
Males in Own Prime and Other Prime Condition

	OWN PRIME		OTHER PRIME	
	TIME 1	TIME 2	TIME 1	TIME 2
OWN MATCHES	2.57	3.66	2.78	3.09
OWN MIS- MATCHES	.66	.38	.61	.46

Table 7.B

Means of Own-related Matches and Own-related Mismatches for
Females in Own Prime and Other Prime Condition

	OWN PRIME		OTHER PRIME	
	TIME 1	TIME 2	TIME 1	TIME 2
OWN MATCHES	3.46	3.48	3.16	3.92
OWN MIS- MATCHES	.55	.58	.45	.38

Table 8.A

Means for Other-related Matches and Other-related Mismatches
for males in Own Prime and Other Prime Condition

	OWN PRIME		OTHER PRIME	
	TIME 1	TIME 2	TIME 1	TIME 2
OTHER MATCHES	2.25	3.19	2.25	2.28
OTHER MIS-MATCHES	.44	.32	.25	.27

Table 8.B

Means for Other-related Matches and Other-related Mismatches
for Females in Own Prime and Other Prime Condition

	OWN PRIME		OTHER PRIME	
	TIME 1	TIME 2	TIME 1	TIME 2
OTHER MATCHES	2.41	2.92	2.28	3.36
OTHER MIS-MATCHES	.43	.60	.46	.42

Self-Discrepancy Model

Higgins (1987)




FIGURE 2

Mean difference scores of Own-related Matches for males and females





FIGURE 3

Mean difference scores of Other-related matches for males and females



Part I: Your Own Beliefs About You

On the following page you will be asked to list the attributes of the type of person that YOU believe you actually are. Your actual self refers to your beliefs concerning the attributes or characteristics you think you actually possess.

In addition to listing traits, you will be asked about the extent to which you believe you actually possess each trait. Please make these ratings after you have listed the attributes.

Please list the attributes of the type of person YOU believe you actually are:

	EXTENT
1. _____	_____
2. _____	_____
3. _____	_____
4. _____	_____
5. _____	_____
6. _____	_____
7. _____	_____
8. _____	_____
9. _____	_____
10. _____	_____

For each attribute above, rate the extent to which YOU believe you actually possess the attribute, using the following scale:

1	2	3	4
slightly	moderately	a great deal	extremely

Part II

Other people also have beliefs about you. In this section of the questionnaire you will be asked to list the attributes of the type of person that your mother and your father would ideally like you to be and believe you ought to be.

Your Ideal Self:

Refers to your beliefs concerning the attributes or characteristics you would ideally like to possess; the type of person you wish, desire, or hope to be.

Your Ought Self:

Refers to your beliefs concerning the attributes or characteristics you believe you ought to possess; the type of person you believe it is your duty obligation or responsibility to be.

In addition to listing traits, you will be asked about the extent to which you believe you actually possess, would like to possess or ought to possess each trait. Make these ratings after you have listed the attributes.

Please list the attributes of the type of person your mother would ideally like you to be (i.e., wishes, desires, or hopes you to be):

EXTENT

- | | | |
|-----|-------|-------|
| 1. | _____ | _____ |
| 2. | _____ | _____ |
| 3. | _____ | _____ |
| 4. | _____ | _____ |
| 5. | _____ | _____ |
| 6. | _____ | _____ |
| 7. | _____ | _____ |
| 8. | _____ | _____ |
| 9. | _____ | _____ |
| 10. | _____ | _____ |

For each attribute above, rate the extent to which your mother would ideally like you to possess the attribute, using the following scale:

1	2	3	4
slightly	moderately	a great deal	extremely

Please list the attributes of the type of person your mother believes you ought to be (i.e., believes it is your duty, obligation, or responsibility to be):

EXTENT

- | | | |
|-----|-------|-------|
| 1. | _____ | _____ |
| 2. | _____ | _____ |
| 3. | _____ | _____ |
| 4. | _____ | _____ |
| 5. | _____ | _____ |
| 6. | _____ | _____ |
| 7. | _____ | _____ |
| 8. | _____ | _____ |
| 9. | _____ | _____ |
| 10. | _____ | _____ |

For each attribute above, rate the extent to which your mother believes you ought to possess the attribute, using the following scale:

1	2	3	4
slightly	moderately	a great deal	extremely

Please list the attributes of the type of person your father would ideally like you to be (i.e., wishes, desires, or hopes you to be):

EXTENT

- | | | |
|-----|-------|-------|
| 1. | _____ | _____ |
| 2. | _____ | _____ |
| 3. | _____ | _____ |
| 4. | _____ | _____ |
| 5. | _____ | _____ |
| 6. | _____ | _____ |
| 7. | _____ | _____ |
| 8. | _____ | _____ |
| 9. | _____ | _____ |
| 10. | _____ | _____ |

For each attribute above, rate the extent to which your father would ideally like you to possess the attribute, using the following scale:

1	2	3	4
slightly	moderately	a great deal	extremely

Please list the attributes of the type of person your father believes you ought to be (i.e., believes it is your duty, obligation, or responsibility to be):

EXTENT

- | | | |
|-----|-------|-------|
| 1. | _____ | _____ |
| 2. | _____ | _____ |
| 3. | _____ | _____ |
| 4. | _____ | _____ |
| 5. | _____ | _____ |
| 6. | _____ | _____ |
| 7. | _____ | _____ |
| 8. | _____ | _____ |
| 9. | _____ | _____ |
| 10. | _____ | _____ |

For each attribute above, rate the extent to which your father believes you ought to possess the attribute, using the following scale:

1	2	3	4
slightly	moderately	a great deal	extremely

APPENDIX 2

This questionnaire includes 17 statements that may be descriptive of people. Please indicate on the scales provided how characteristic these are of you.

1. I'm always trying to figure myself out.

0 _____ 1 _____ 2 _____ 3 _____ 4
 extremely uncharacteristic _____ extremely characteristic

2. I'm concerned about my style of doing things.

0 _____ 1 _____ 2 _____ 3 _____ 4
 extremely uncharacteristic _____ extremely characteristic

3. Generally, I'm not very aware of myself.

0 _____ 1 _____ 2 _____ 3 _____ 4
 extremely uncharacteristic _____ extremely characteristic

4. I reflect about myself alot.

0 _____ 1 _____ 2 _____ 3 _____ 4
 extremely uncharacteristic _____ extremely characteristic

5. I am concerned about the way I present myself.

0 _____ 1 _____ 2 _____ 3 _____ 4
 extremely uncharacteristic _____ extremely characteristic

6. I am often the subject of my own fantasies.

0 _____ 1 _____ 2 _____ 3 _____ 4
 extremely uncharacteristic _____ extremely characteristic

13. I sometimes have the feeling that I am off somewhere watching myself.

0 _____ 1 _____ 2 _____ 3 _____ 4
 extremely uncharacteristic _____ extremely characteristic

14. I am concerned about what other people think of me.

0 _____ 1 _____ 2 _____ 3 _____ 4
 extremely uncharacteristic _____ extremely characteristic

15. I'm alert to changes in my mood.

0 _____ 1 _____ 2 _____ 3 _____ 4
 extremely uncharacteristic _____ extremely characteristic

16. I'm usually aware of my appearance.

0 _____ 1 _____ 2 _____ 3 _____ 4
 extremely uncharacteristic _____ extremely characteristic

17. I'm aware of the way my mind works when I go through a problem.

0 _____ 1 _____ 2 _____ 3 _____ 4
 extremely uncharacteristic _____ extremely characteristic